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Syria’s Bloody Arab Spring
Christopher Phillips 
When the dictatorial regimes of Tunisia and Egypt were toppled by popular unrest few expected 
Syria to follow. Despite suffering under dictatorship for over 40 years and facing similar 
economic and social challenges that had prompted rebellion elsewhere, Syrians appeared to 
support their young president, Bashar al-Assad, who had cultivated an image as a populist 
anti-western moderniser. When protests did eventually reach Syria in March 2011, in the 
southern town of Deraa, they called on Assad to reform not resign. Yet any faith in Assad 
as a reformer soon evaporated. His security forces responded with live fire, killing hundreds 
in Deraa and elsewhere, while the president offered only piecemeal reforms. The regime 
fashioned a narrative that protests were led by criminal armed gangs, intent on stirring up 
sectarian divisions within Syria’s heterogeneous population. Yet in these early stages it was 
mostly regime-backed Shabiha militia from Assad’s own Alawi sect that were responsible for 
any violence, while most protestors remained peaceful and inclusive. Tragically, as regime 
violence continued and protests spread, with over 9,000 deaths in the first year, that narrative 
became a self-fulfilling prophecy. Not only have some taken up arms against Assad, but 
sectarianism is increasing, with the Alawi community as a whole blamed for Assad’s excesses.
Yet the regime still appears far from collapse. The opposition, both within Syria and exiles abroad, 
has proved unable to win over key segments of Syrian society. The international community remains 
divided on what action to take, with western and Arab economic sanctions only frustrating rather 
than disabling the regime, while Russia, China and Iran continue to explicitly or implicitly back Assad. 
After a year of violence Syria looks headed for a civil war between the regime and the poorly armed 
but determined opposition, with the potential to transform one of the Middle East’s most stable states 
into a sectarian bloodbath.
THE CAUSES OF THE UPRISING
The uprising can be partly explained by examining who has and hasn’t been willing to rebel against 
Assad. Opposition activity has been concentrated in certain areas, suggesting that certain ethnic, 
economic, demographic and geographical groups harbour more anti-regime feeling than others. For 
decades, the security state established by Hafez al-Assad, Bashar’s father, encouraged certain social 
and economic inequalities as a means of divide and rule. Hafez won the support of Syria’s working 
class and peasantry, largely from Syria’s Sunni Arabs who make up 60 percent of the population, by 
building a large socialist state that provided employment and subsidies. He won the backing of Syria’s 
non Sunni Arab minorities – the Christians (10 percent of the population), Druze (3 percent) and his own 
Alawi sect (10 percent). These groups welcomed Hafez’s secular Arab nationalist identity discourse as 
a means to integration, an identity that he promoted through expanded state institutions, notably the 
army and the ruling Ba’ath party. While this coalition of support was sufficient to build a popular base, 
Hafez deliberately excluded some groups: Syria’s Kurds (15 percent of the population) and the former 
Sunni Arab ruling elite, as well as landowners and larger merchants that opposed his socialist policies. 
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When Bashar inherited power on his father’s death 
in 2000, he inherited a system that was stable but 
had fostered divisions. Although he enjoyed personal 
popularity, his reforms exacerbated and increased 
resentment towards the regime as a whole. Economic 
reforms alienated the Sunni Arab workers and 
peasantry, as Bashar moved to open up the economy 
more rapidly. Syria’s GDP grew, but subsidies to Syria’s 
poorest were cut and public sector employment 
decreased. Rather than genuine liberalisation, those 
close to power amassed huge fortunes through 
government contracts and monopolies. This new 
generation of crony capitalists were visibly excessive, 
and a disproportionately high number of this elite 
were Alawis, with Bashar making far less effort than 
Hafez had to balance the sect’s privileged position by 
promoting prominent Sunni Arab families, fuelling 
resentment among the formerly supportive Sunni 
Arab poor. 
Some trends, of course, were beyond the regime’s 
control. Rural Syria was hit by a major drought from 
2007-10, hitting the peasantry hard, with Assad’s 
inept government exacerbating matters through 
mismanagement of agricultural resources and 
corruption. This prompted a wave of migration from 
the countryside to the over-crowded cities. Syria, like 
many Arab states, had witnessed a demographic boom 
in the 1980s that brought a glut of youth to the labour 
market that the economy could not accommodate. 
Just when more jobs were needed, Assad’s reforms 
actually shrank the labour market further. Alongside 
the shrinking of the state in the economy, its 
role in society decreased, with the influence and 
funding of the army and Ba’ath party heavily cut, 
meaning young Syrians received less government 
indoctrination. On top of this, Bashar encouraged a 
more conservative form of Islam to be preached among 
Sunni communities, hoping to restrict the growing 
regional trend of Islamic conservatism to society rather 
than politics. However, while he successfully co-opted 
some, notably Aleppo’s ulema (clergy) from whom he 
appointed Syria’s new Grand Mufti in 2004, in other 
areas this revived a sense of Sunni superiority and 
activism. It is not surprising that mosques and Friday 
prayers became the focal point for demonstrations, 
while the quiet of Aleppo’s mosques helps explain 
that city’s relative disengagement from the uprising. 
In general, the most persistent sources of opposition 
activity since 2011 have been in poorer religious Sunni 
Arab areas such as Deraa, Jisr al-Shughour, Homs, Idleb, 
Douma and Hama, and frustrated youth have taken 
the lead. In contrast, the areas that have remained 
relatively quiet are those benefitting from economic 
changes or co-opted, such as central Damascus and 
Aleppo, or areas dominated by traditionally supportive 
ethnic groups, notably the Alawi-dominated cities of 
Tartous and Lattakia. 
Despite these long-term structural resentments, the 
outbreak of the uprising was not inevitable, and 
several short-term factors played a key role. The most 
obvious trigger was the toppling of dictatorial regimes 
in Tunisia and Egypt. Prior to 2011, unauthorised public 
demonstrations of any sort in Syria were extremely 
rare. With the exception of the short-lived Kurdish 
Serhildan (uprising) in eastern Syria in 2004, opponents 
of Assad’s rule had largely restricted themselves to 
timid declarations. The empowering effect of the 
Arab Spring on Syria’s protestors was seen in their 
mimicking of techniques and slogans from elsewhere. 
The use of Facebook (only formally legalised by Assad 
in January 2011), YouTube and Twitter to organise 
demonstrations, as well as slogans such as ‘the people 
demand the end of the regime’ and preparing a 
different name for each Friday of protest were all 
borrowed from other Arab revolts. The success of 
Libya’s rebels in defeating Colonel Gaddafi militarily 
further inspired some of Syria’s protestors, this time to 
take up arms and to revert to a pre-Ba’athist national 
flag, mimicking Libya’s reversion to a pre-Gaddafi 
banner. Having spent decades telling Syrians to be 
proud Arabs, the regime was taken aback when its 
people suddenly demanded the same karama (dignity) 
won by their ‘cousins’ elsewhere. 
The other key trigger was the regime’s violent reaction. 
Arguably, even after the first protests, Bashar enjoyed 
enough personal support that he could have rescued 
the situation. Soon after the Deraa killings, Bashar 
gave a much anticipated speech before Parliament 
on March 30, 2011, yet he neither apologised 
nor offered any reforms. Subsequent speeches on 
April  16 and June 20 were equally uninspiring. 
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In the meantime, the regime’s forces, supported by 
the mysterious Shabiha militia, cracked down violently 
on the growing number protests across the country. 
The funerals of murdered demonstrators became a 
focal point for further protests and, when people 
were killed on those demonstrations, a snowball effect 
took place. While the inner workings of the regime 
remain opaque, Bashar’s inner circle apparently clashed 
over the best response to the crisis. Hardliners led 
by Bashar’s younger brother Maher, commander of 
the elite 4th Armoured Division that has been at the 
vanguard of the suppression, reportedly triumphed 
over those in favour of a negotiated solution. The 
violent response that was settled upon clearly sought 
to repeat the ‘success’ that Hafez had in brutally 
crushing a rebellion by the Muslim Brotherhood in 
the late 1970s and 80s, that eventually led to the 
massacre of over 10,000 fighters and civilians in 
Hama in 1982. Although regime hardliners viewed 
the challenge as a repeat of the 1980s - fighting 
‘terrorists’ - this approach finally shattered any hopes 
from the opposition that Bashar would be different 
form his  father. While past resentments placed some 
distance between the president as an individual and 
his corrupt, tortuous security officials and cronies, 
his willingness to repeatedly use violence prompted 
the radicalisation of the opposition, from peacefully 
wanting reform to demanding regime change. 
WHY THE REGIME HAS SURVIVED SO FAR
Parts of Syria have been in open rebellion for over a 
year and yet, unlike the dictators of Tunisia, Egypt, 
Yemen and Libya, Assad remains in place. The reasons 
for his survival thus far are multi-fold. Firstly, key pillars 
of the regime remain in place. Multiple coups following 
independence in 1946 led Hafez to design his regime 
to be ‘coup-proof’, with four over-lapping intelligence 
agencies to spy on the population, the army and one 
another. This has thus far prevented the kind of internal 
moves by the military that toppled the Egyptian and 
Tunisian presidents. On the contrary, Syria’s military 
and security forces, packed at the higher echelons with 
arch loyalists, many from the Alawi sect, have proven 
fiercely loyal to the regime: willing to slaughter their 
countrymen in a manner that Egypt’s army refused. 
Another key pillar has been the continued support 
the regime enjoys from parts of society. While Assad’s 
economic reforms shrank his social base he retained 
the support of some groups: minorities that were 
sceptical of majoritarian Sunni Arab rule - the Alawis, 
Christians and Druze - and some members of the 
Sunni Middle classes, particularly in commercially-
successful Aleppo. In the early days of the uprising 
huge regime-orchestrated pro-Assad displays attracted 
hundreds of thousands. Some loyalists genuinely 
support the regime, buying the narrative of ‘armed 
groups’ backed by foreign powers, or believing in 
Assad’s hollow reforms. More likely is that many fear 
for their fate if the regime collapses. Christians are 
wary of the experiences of their Iraqi brethren after 
Saddam Hussein’s demise, with over a quarter fleeing 
targeted sectarian killings. The Alawis, many of whom 
contrary to popular belief did not benefit greatly from 
the Assad regime, also fear for their future, concerned 
that they will be blamed for Assad’s violence. Fear of 
the security forces may still cow people, with middle 
class Sunni Arabs aware that they have much more 
to lose by opposing the regime than the poor of 
Deraa and Homs. Some businessmen are reportedly 
playing a double game, declaring their support for 
Assad, while secretly funding the opposition to avoid 
any post-regime recrimination. Though this may help 
individuals in the future, it does little to persuade the 
‘undecided middle’ or the arch-loyalists to switch 
sides, and the relative neutrality of these key groups 
has kept protests out of the two major city centres 
and denied the opposition the visible support of the 
majority of the population.
The opposition’s weakness has also aided the 
regime. Assad’s opponents initially organised 
Local Coordination Committees (LCCs) to arrange 
demonstrations in centres of rebellion. These proved 
effective as they were largely leaderless, meaning that 
the regime had no ringleaders to arrest or kill. Despite 
thousands of arrests, these committees continue to 
be the leading organisers of peaceful protest on the 
ground even after a year. However, the desire for 
international backing prompted the formation of an 
opposition in exile, the Syrian National Council (SNC), 
in Istanbul in August 2011. Yet the SNC has has not 
won enough internal support. Syria’s leading Kurdish 
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grouping for example, the newly formed Kurdish 
National Council (KNC), has declined to join the SNC 
because of the dominant position given to the exiled 
Muslim Brotherhood, largely opposed by secular Kurds, 
and the council’s base in Turkey, a long-time opponent 
of Kurdish rights. The SNC is seen as out of touch with 
events on the ground compared to the LCCs, while 
older opponents of the regime that have remained in 
Syria rather than spent decades in exile, such as Louay 
Hussein or Michel Kilo, have complained of the bullish 
stance taken by the SNC abroad. Even within the 
SNC there have been clear divisions, with key activists 
such as former judge, Haitham al-Maleh, walking out 
of the council complaining of poor leadership. The 
issue of whether to seek western military intervention 
has been particularly divisive. Given the decades of 
systematic repression meted out by the Baath regime 
on all opposition, this inability to organise and unite is 
perhaps not surprising, but it has meant that, despite 
much goodwill and support from the western powers 
and several Arab states, the SNC has been unable to 
secure the kind of armed backing afforded the National 
Transitional Council (NTC) in Libya. 
Also seemingly inspired by events in Libya was the 
formation of the Free Syria Army (FSA), in July 2011 
by defecting Syrian army officers that had fled to 
Turkey. Its leader, Colonel Riad al-Asaad, stated that 
the security forces willingness to kill civilians made 
them a legitimate target and called on soldiers to 
defect, eventually swelling their ranks to approximately 
20-25,000 largely low-ranking officers and soldiers, 
mostly Sunni Arabs. The bulk of the 400,000-strong 
regime military has remained intact however, and no 
whole units or heavy weaponry has switched sides. The 
West steadfastly refuses to arm the rebels and, despite 
Saudi Arabia and Qatar’s enthusiasm, their supplies 
are limited. Attempts to take and hold territory that 
could form the base for opposition military operations 
have failed, leading the regime to brutally crush rebel 
strongholds such as the Baba Amr district of Homs. It 
remains unclear how much control Colonel al-Asaad 
actually has over the various militia nominally under 
his banner. US fears that Al-Qaeda may be operating 
within the FSA are probably embellished, but some 
fighters are certainly inspired by political Islam, as seen 
by the naming of some militias after Sunni historical 
figures. While journalists such as Al-Jazeera’s Nir Rosen 
that have been embedded with the FSA highlight that 
most fighters are pious rather than overtly Islamist, 
there remains the possibility of increased radicalisation 
as the conflict becomes more violent. 
The potential for sectarian conflict has been another 
tool used by the regime to cling onto power. For decades 
the regime promoted itself as a bastion of stability for 
Syria’s heterogeneous population compared to the 
sectarian chaos in neighbouring Iraq and Lebanon. 
At the same time it subtly ensured that sectarian 
differences between Syria’s different communities were 
not forgotten. It privileged the Alawis, discriminated 
against the Kurds, and maintained legal barriers 
between Muslims and Christians. Although Baathist 
rhetoric spoke of a united Arab Syrian identity, the 
reality was a more complex manipulation of different 
identities at different times. The regime tapped into 
these identities by raising the spectre of a sectarian 
civil war as soon as the uprising began, accusing the 
opposition of fostering sectarianism. Yet it was the 
regime’s Shabiha that were deliberately stirring up 
ethnic violence to scare the minorities and those that 
feared civil war into backing the regime, for example 
by delivering sandbags to Alawi areas and warning 
of Sunni attacks. The protestors emphasised their 
inclusiveness early on, shouting slogans such as ‘all 
the Syrians are one’, but as regime violence continued 
and non-Sunnis largely backed the regime, sectarian 
attacks increased, especially in war-torn Homs, and 
sectarian chants emerged such as, ‘we didn’t used to 
hate the Alawis, now we do’, or ‘Sunni blood is one’. 
While the majority of the opposition still insist that 
they are not motivated by sectarianism, the potential 
for an ethnic civil war increases as violence continues, 
apparently the regime’s cynical survival strategy in 
the first place. 
Further aiding the regime have been the divisions 
within the international community. Unlike in Libya, 
military options don’t appeal to western powers, 
Turkey and Saudi Arabia and Qatar, who have rallied 
most of the Arab League against Assad. Airstrikes 
and a no-fly zone, or even just establishing protective 
‘humanitarian corridors’ around border areas, could 
be launched from Turkey or Cyprus, but Assad has 
far better air defences than Gaddafi making foreign 
casualties likely. Moreover, the FSA are not in a position 
to make significant gains on the ground as did the 
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rebels in Libya, and any military strikes could increase 
instability and catalyse the descent into chaos. Arming 
the FSA directly, without the major military defections 
thus far not seen, is unlikely to allow them to pose 
a genuine threat anytime soon. Moreover, after Libya 
most of the anti-Assad camp, especially Turkey, which 
would likely take a leading role in any military action, 
recognise the need for UN approval of any moves, 
and that is unlikely to happen. 
Russia and China have blocked far more modest moves 
against Syria in the UN Security Council. Both generally 
oppose international interference in states’ internal 
matters, and Russia in particular has a long-standing 
strategic relationship with Syria, which hosts Moscow’s 
only Mediterranean naval base. Additionally, Russia 
felt that NATO overstepped its UN-mandated remit in 
Libya and is determined that the same will not happen 
in Syria. Putin also may also have a personal loyalty 
to Bashar, who was one of the few heads of state 
to publically support the Russian leader’s invasion of 
Georgia in 2008. Although Russia and China both 
endorsed the ceasefire plan of former UN Secretary 
General Kofi Annan in Spring 2012, which importantly 
dropped the demand that Assad step down, few 
expect the regime to permanently halt its violence 
and it is questionable whether Russia would abandon 
the regime even if it did not. Despite opposition from 
the west and the Arab League, who have initiated 
economic sanctions on Syria, Assad retains important 
friends that allow him to avoid total isolation. As well 
as Chinese and Russian diplomatic cover at the UN, 
with Moscow still supplying Damascus weaponry, long-
term ally Iran is offering advice on sanctions-busting 
and defeating the opposition, as well as purchasing 
Syrian oil to replace European demand and ensuring 
its other Arab allies, Iraq and Lebanon, defy the Arab 
League’s trade embargo on Syria. Syria’s importance 
on the fault lines of so many conflicts in the region – 
the Arab-Israeli conflict, Lebanon, Iraq, Kurdish issues 
and Saudi Arabia and the West’s battle with Iran – has 
ensured interest and interference from many regional 
and international powers, but also a degree of caution 
to avoid pushing the country into chaos.
SCENARIOS FOR SYRIA’S FUTURE
Syria is therefore in stalemate. The regime is far from 
finished but the opposition seems unlikely to give up. 
The violence looks set only to increase as each side 
radicalises: the regime believing that the international 
community’s punishments can be withstood, while 
parts of the opposition slide towards Islamism and 
sectarianism. With direct external intervention 
seemingly ruled out, all scenarios for the future appear 
grim. Most unlikely is that the opposition will break 
through and topple the regime through popular 
protest or military success. The FSA is too weak and, 
even with Western or Gulf arms, will take years to 
reach parity with the military. Similarly, the opposition 
seems unable to win enough support to prompt the 
mass demonstrations in Damascus and Aleppo that 
worked in Tunisia. The decline of the economy under 
sanctions might prompt a coalition of merchants and 
the military to mount a coup against Assad to preserve 
their status, but the military is constructed to be loyal 
and have remained so, and they now have blood 
on their own hands after the crackdown. Similarly, 
the merchant class have stayed quiet and sanctions 
elsewhere suggest that the middle classes are more 
likely to emigrate than turn on the regime – a trend 
that has already begun in Syria.
What looks more likely is that, to the chagrin of 
Western and Gulf leaders, Assad holds on, as did 
Saddam Hussein after 1991. Assad clearly believes 
he can contain the threat of the FSA and cow his 
population back into submission. However, it is 
doubtful that the FSA would ever surrender, and so 
the conflict could evolve into a long-running guerrilla 
insurgency. Moreover, Assad’s ability to rule as an 
army of occupation indefinitely is unsustainable both 
militarily and economically. Thus the final scenario 
is some form of civil war, which already appears 
to be breaking out. The regime would probably 
prefer a repetition of the Algerian civil war when 
the radicalisation and violence of the opposition 
eventually won the military government more support 
than it initially had, enabling it to re-impose control. 
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Alternatively, incremental opposition gains might erode 
the authority of the state, leading to a weak central 
state in Damascus and Aleppo, but militia rule in the 
countryside, as happened in parts of Lebanon during 
its civil war. Moreover, with the FSA already looking 
like it could fragment into different militia, there is 
a prospect of Syria becoming a failed state. While 
there remains a slither of hope that an internationally 
brokered negotiated solution could be found, nothing 
the regime has done so far suggests it is willing to 
compromise. With the Assad regime seemingly willing 
to destroy Syria rather than give up power, the future 
looks bleak. ■
